

# Algerian popular movement and economic growth

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*The research is financed by:* University of Constantine – Algeria

## Abstract

The study worked to find the relationship between the growth of the Algerian per capita GDP and the simultaneous period before the popular Algerian movement and the period after the popular Algerian movement for the period 2014-2021, our results came in line with the hypotheses of the study, where the deterioration of economic conditions was documented from 2014 until the period 2019, where it was found that the per capita GDP is strongly affected by the conditions Before the popular Algerian movement and after the popular Algerian movement, our estimates indicate that the per capita GDP is mainly affected by the reductions of the fiscal deficit associated with the program before the period of the Algerian popular movement.

**Keywords:** The movement, the Algerian popular movement, economic growth

## 1. Introduction

The masses of countries resort to revolution in order to change the political system and improve their living conditions, and that this means that there is a mass awareness of the need for change, which in those societies is witnessing a popular movement, which is often spontaneous and sudden, that is, at an unlimited and unplanned time, and that The term popular movement differs from revolution and protest, the latter being a precursor to the movement, and the latter being a precursor to the revolution. Therefore, the popular movement is a group of activities and movements carried out by a group of people who feel feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction with the political situation and its negative repercussions on the living and living conditions. Awareness of change and they aim for it, that is, changing the political, economic and social reality that does not meet their needs to a reality closer to the concepts of social justice that they aspire to.

The Arab world at the end of 2010 and until the present moment entered a pivotal stage in its history, characterized by social and political movement, to the necessity of the requirements to re-impose a popular political will represented by the masses of protests and demonstrations that erupted in some Arab countries, to change the form and content of governance without accepting the conditions and

promises of guarantees Because the old ruling authority continues to remain in positions of responsibility, especially since the legitimacy of the latter is crumbling as part of the outcomes of what was known as the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, not to mention the beginning of an acceptable pattern of pressure popular movement that seeks change in the previous ruling equation, both at the level of the political class ruling or even at the level of the forces and parties of traditional political action.

The revolutions and popular protests that have taken place in many Arab countries since a year ago 2011 a case of change that affected some totalitarian regimes that practice a pattern of patterns

Deep authoritarianism, while other regimes have relied on political pluralism

A formal democracy that took place under what was known as a wave of political and constitutional reforms that faltered to a large extent; But what is remarkable is that the latter pattern is becoming more and more confusing in life

The general political situation, due to the plurality and weakness of the players in the political arena itself (forces the political opposition, etc.), from here we found that the ruling political class was not able to anyone

Now from the emergence of a new legitimacy as an alternative to the legitimacy of the consolidation of its influence and influence by force at times; Not to mention its repeated failure to accomplish the minimum levels of democratic reforms in light of the continuation of the state of political closure without absorbing the waves of the forces of political change.

And the social happening in the reality of the structure of the state on the other hand. And between this and that, there was a state of the closure in the structure of the political system to itself and its inability to absorb the emergence of any movement popular or new opposition political forces, as long as the exercise of power revolves around the circle of the elites.

The ruling party may fear that it will compete strongly with it in many cases. So the waves are connected .Political change with a growing popular movement trying to take advantage of the available opportunities to pounce on the institution of governance whenever he gets the opportunity to do so, and at the same time these elites do not find.

There is no way but to turn back on itself without the ability to recover its lost legitimacy, or even restoring it on the basis of mutual trust with its peoples. As for the current stage, it requires a necessity. Accommodating the demands of the popular movement and the forces of the Arab political opposition while making changes political practice and behavior, and with the help of other effective institutions. This is the case with the role of the military establishment, which has begun to support the popular movement's trends towards change (Egypt as a model in 2011 and Algeria and Sudan in April of the year 2019), with acknowledgment

The right to form a popular pressure system that goes beyond the limits of the work of the ruling power parties and then begins in establishing an equal relationship between the forces of the popular movement and the new emerging political forces, according to the freedom of movement available to it according to the formula for implementing the desired institutional democratic political reform, To be

the real guarantor of the transition to a new stage of democracy and with the help of the movement popular one; But in a different form and another pattern that we found falls within the arrangements that I created

The objective circumstances and factors that have enjoyed the support and support of the active military establishment in the country.

Most of the Arab political systems of government and within the context of their constitutional work to maintain security both the state and society.

Algeria is one of the Arab countries, which sought to change its reality, whether at the political or social and economic level, so came what is known as the popular Algerian movement. The protests began in February of 2019, where tens of thousands of Algerians attended in most cities of Algeria for various social segments or different professional sectors, They were all seeking political, social and economic change in a peaceful manner that the world had not witnessed before. Accordingly, the following problem can be posed:

Did the popular Algerian movement contribute to the impact on the Algerian economy?

## **2. Literature Review**

Social movements are large, often informal groupings of people who come together against power holders around a common cause, in response to situations of perceived inequality, oppression and/or unmet social, political, economic or cultural demands. At their core, social movements are not about “polite debate” or “invited spaces” of interaction between state and society. Social actors coordinate their actions in sustained sequences of opposition and contestation intended to transform existing power structures and dynamics. Social movements are often one of the few (peaceful) options that people, who lack regular access to institutions or who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, possess to challenge established rules of the game – and this is what gives them their contentious character (Tarrow, 1994)

Social-movement research in German-speaking countries has a lively history. In the 1980s, the discourse about social protests was closely connected to the theory of society (Schimank, SOCIETY, this volume). Social-movement studies during that period could hardly be described as an independent sociological research area. The discussion in Germany and other European countries was dominated by the so-called theory of new social movements, which referred in particular to the peace, women’s, and environmental movements (Offe, 1985; Rucht, 1994). Research was primarily focused on their “cultural significance” (Weber, 1949). It was assumed that these protest movements showed “where the reproduction of order does not succeed” (Eder, 2015: 31) and—in the tradition of Marxist class theory—that they reflected a comprehensive shift of modern societies’ fundamental contradictory relations from labor and economy to identity and culture (Touraine, 1985: 774). At that time, social-movement scholars in the United States were discussing entirely different questions. After the demise of the collective-behavior tradition, the focus of research shifted to the micro-level structures of protest mobilization. Under the maxim of “from structure to action” (Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow,

1988), a new generation of researchers not only anticipated “new explanatory advantages but also [articulated; my insertion] a normative claim: bringing the actor back in as something which is good in itself” (Eder, 2015: 35). Instead of exploring the “why” of social movements, their research emphasized the “how.” The ensuing debate was increasingly dominated by the “conceptual triad” (Rucht, 2014: 70) of resource mobilization, framing, and political opportunity structures as central approaches of movement research.

Since then, American and European perspectives have moved substantially closer together. Especially in Germany, the narrow focus on new social movements has been replaced by a broader view that integrates a wider range of micro-, meso-, and macrosociological perspectives. The field of movement research has become more professionalized and has consequently emancipated itself from the theory of society. The discussion is now more internationalized and has opened itself up to inspiration from other scientific disciplines. At the same time, its theoretical approaches and empirical methods have become more diverse, systematic, and ambitious (Rucht, 2014: 85). In view of this vast plurality, an exhausting appraisal of movement research would exceed the scope of this review. The diversity of approaches, topics, and methods that have guided the study of social protest over the past two decades cannot be forced into a single scheme. With this in mind, the following review does not claim to present a body of research that is fully representative of the German-language social sciences. In its second section, this review sheds light on how different theories of society have conceptualized social movements. Have there been any new developments since the theory of new social movements lost its hegemony? The discussion will focus on three contributions, from Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Gerhards, and Ulrich Beck. The third section deals with the long-term transformation of social-cleavage structures and their analysis. In the fourth section, I will shift my attention to the rise of the extreme right and the environmental movement. Most researchers would agree that the recent public discourse in German-speaking countries has mostly been shaped by the expansion of these two movements. Social movements are dynamic, highly contextual phenomena. They differ in how they function and selfidentify, and in the environments in which they emerge. Social historian Charles Tilly (cited in Foweraker, 1995:80)

Social movements mobilise actors and organisations seeking to alter power deficits or challenge authority. They combine three major elements (Tilly, 2006:183-4):

- Old social movements, such as those of 19th century Europe and North America, demanded ‘inclusion and rights within the framework of state and society relations’ (Chester & Welsh, 2011:2).
- The new social movements emerged in the 1960s and 70s ‘out of the crisis of modernity and focus on struggles over symbolic (Horn, 2013:21).

Social movements that are able to sustain themselves share some common characteristics (Batliwala 2012; Snow, 2013:1201):

- They are change-oriented – whether they seek change or oppose it – although the level and extent of the change sought may vary.

- They challenge or defend existing institutional systems of authority (political, religious, corporate, educational or cultural).

- They are collective enterprises.

The characteristics above outline what movements have in common. (Fominaya 2014: 9-11) sets out four characteristics to help differentiate social movements:

- Phases of visible or latent activity Movements have visible and latent phases (Melucci, cited in Fominaya, 2014:9)

- Prefigurative politics Some social movements seek to use tactics and practices that embody or 'prefigure' the kind of society they want to create (Maecklebergh 2011:1)

- Social movements versus social movement organisations A social movement organisation (SMO) may identify with and promote a social movement's goals, yet is usually more formally organised (McCarthy & Zald, 1977)

- Progressive, uncivil, regressive movements and countermovements Not all social movements work toward progressive social change

Social movements and civil society mobilisation indicate a lively civil society. They have existed across centuries, and are formidable political forces that 'affirm the importance of "civil society actors" in the processes of social and political change' (Bebbington, 2010:4)

Social movements are vital ingredients in the processes of change and reform, but the causal link between social movements and social and political change is a complex one – difficult to anticipate and assess (Fernando, 2012). Most existing work focuses on movements' political and policy outcomes, and pays little attention to their cultural and institutional impacts at the grassroots. Further, social movements are not homogenous but diffused entities, and change outcomes may be made possible by a host of actors, rather than social movements alone (Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999).

Early debates on measuring the political impacts or the 'success' of movements looked at whether movements had gained 'acceptance' (as politically legitimate actors or through inclusion in state politics) or had created 'new advantages' (political opportunities for movement constituents) (Gamson, 1990).

Most of the reviewed literature calls for caution, or is critical of such engagements as being ineffective or counterproductive rather than facilitating change (Tadros, 2011; Fernando, 2012; Sogge & Dütting, 2010; Joyce & Walker, 2015; Peiffer, 2015; Stephan et al., 2015). One prominent reason is that the political nature of social movements often stands at odds with the neutral stance donors may wish to maintain. In addition, there is little evidence of collective action theories informing development programmes, although external actors may have used such a lens to analyse obstacles (Peiffer, 2015:2).

Social movements and other channels of voice and representation

Contemporary progressive social movements continue to diverge on the question of how much effort to invest in engaging with formal state institutions and also on changing the terms of their relationships with citizens. Over the past two decades, more traditional formal channels of voice and representation, including political parties and parliaments, have experienced a deepening crisis of representation, with

people across the developed and the developing world ranking them as the institutions they trust least. This kind of disillusionment has contributed to the growth of social movements, as citizens seek different means to exercise voice more effectively. How this has worked, and how this has affected representation deserves closer attention (For example, can informal social movements substitute political parties, and if so how?). Over time, different social movements have transformed themselves into political parties (e.g. the Workers Party in Brazil, or the Aam Aadmi Party in India), and have sought to promote progressive agendas, more or less successfully, from within the formal political system. Nevertheless, linkages between social movements and political parties, and their potential impact on policy and broader political outcomes remain unexplored (Piccio, 2015)

### **Social movements and ICTs**

The rapid advancement of the internet, personal computers and mobile phone technologies has had a fundamental impact on social movements (Brecher et al. 2009). The rise of ICTs has opened up new opportunities for mobilisation and collective action that would have seemed unimaginable only a decade ago. ICTs offer the ability to create social networks, receive and share information and participate in collective action even when social norms or political repression limit physical movement or public visibility. However, ICTs are only tools of mobilisation; what gives technology its transformational power is the ways in which people use, appropriate and produce technologies as part of their strategies and objectives.

#### **Donor engagement with social movements**

While donors have made considerable investments to support civil society across the developing world (including non-governmental organisations, media outlets, etc.), engagement with social movements has remained rare. There are a number of reasons for this (Fernando 2012):

- The emergence of social movements is often unpredictable, making planning for engagement a challenge.
- Social movements are deeply political in what they hope to achieve, often in confrontational ways. The use of extra-legal activity (e.g. protests, civil disobedience, land and building occupations) is not something that international development actors feel comfortable with. Further, there are concerns that governments in partner countries may resent international donors for supporting groups perceived as the 'opposition'.

- The informality of social movements makes it difficult to engage with them on the basis of donor requirements and bureaucratic procedures. As the post-Arab Spring experience suggests, direct support to social movements can be extremely challenging, because donors do not always understand the local context in which the movements operate. For example, it is often not clear how representative different social movements are, and whom they seek to represent. These movements also tend to be leaderless, and while their organic, flat nature can be effective in many ways (like bringing down dictators across the Arab World), this strength can turn into a weakness when it comes to developing agendas for change and being able to engage with other relevant actors, be it the state they oppose, or international actors who seek to support them.

The Algerian Hirak movement, also known as the “Revolution of Smiles,” is a peaceful democracy movement that started off on 22 February 2019 in Algiers, then expanded to encompass all of the 48 districts in Algeria. The Hirak was directed mainly against the ousted president Bouteflika’s fifth mandate, which reflected a direct violation of the constitution due to his health condition that did not allow him to fully exercise his constitutional duties. According to Hamidou (2019), a number of features have distinguished the Algerian protest movement. First of all, its unanticipated nature as it was a quick reaction to the social mobilization and protest calls circulated on social media, namely Facebook and Instagram led by Algeria’s youth against Bouteflika’s fifth mandate (Hamidou, 2019). It is noteworthy that the Algerian protest movement was not affiliated to any particular individual, quarter or political party as it had been organized peacefully by the general public every Friday and by students every Tuesday. Secondly, its geographic and demographic diversification as it was born by a broad alliance between all social segments regardless of age, gender, professional background or ethnic group, Arabs and Amazigh, across 48 distinct districts against the regime. In fact the role of social media in bridging the social and geographical distance, fostering collaboration and controlling the behaviour of protestors during the Hirak cannot be underestimated (Hamidou, 2019).

A further hallmark of the Algerian revolution was the military support, under the leadership of Algeria’s army chief Gaid Salah, for the Algerian protestors to meet their demands and to practice pressure on the ex-president and his inner circle to step down. The main incidents that followed the waves of protests include the resignation of the ailing president Abdelaziz Bouteflika on 2 April 2019, nomination of Abdelkader Bensalah as Algeria’s interim president for 90 days, the arrest of the ex-president’s brother Said Bouteflik and numerous prominent former ministers, businesspeople and politicians most of whom were close allies of the ousted president, cancellation of the 4th of July presidential elections, the announcement of new presidential election for 12 December 2019 and the five presidential candidates (the former Prime Ministers Ali Benflis and Abdelmadjid Tebboune, former Tourism Minister Abdelkader Bengrine, Abdelaziz Belaid, head of the El Mostakbal Movement party and former Culture Minister Azzedine Mihoubi), the death of Algeria’s army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah, announcement of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as the winner of the presidential election, among others.



The non-violent nature of the Algerian mass demonstrations featured as a trend in many international TV channels and news articles (e.g., BBC, CNN, France 24). Commenting on the Algerian movement, Guemar et al. (2019) stated that “On the 22 February 2019, Algerians launched one of the most impressive social movements for democracy the world has seen—and one which is largely unreported in the West”. Such non-violent representation of this movement trended throughout its first month (e.g., BBC, CNN, France 24). However, some scholars claimed that media coverage of sensitive events tends to be not just a narrative depiction but ideologically biased (Fairclough, 1995; Rabab’ah & Alali, 2020; Rabab’ah et al., 2019; Van Dijk, 1985)

### 3. Methodology and Data

Our empirical analysis uses data extracted from the State of Algeria during the period 2014-2021, and the data used are derived from World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Governance Indicators (WGI); Both are databases of the World Bank. The dependent variable is the real annual growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPC), so we estimate the growth variable using the difference in the GDPC log between the two periods  $t$  and  $t + 1$  over time (1,2...),  $T$ )

The empirical analysis was estimated using dynamic GMM regression, which includes a lagging endogenous variable as an explanatory variable in order to make the endogenous variable uncorrelated with the error term. The model's independent variables represent a comprehensive set of factors that significantly affect economic development and growth, categorized into macroeconomic and public governance variables. Macroeconomic variables include government budget balance and public debt (all in current billions of dollars); The trade balance (total exports minus total imports of goods and services in current billions of US\$) and FDI inflows (measured in current billions of US\$) are vital determinants of growth. Due to the constraints imposed by the balance of payments position on growth, the growth rate of a country's exports is directly proportional to its economic growth. Foreign direct investment encourages technology transfers that enhance overall economic growth. Some additional macroeconomic control variables have been found to be important measures of economic growth: population size measured in millions, inflation rate, unemployment rate, as well as popular mobility measured in estimated values by means of media

The equation takes the following form:

$$GR_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 GR_{t-1} + \alpha_2 PM_t + \alpha_t (other) + \varepsilon_t$$

(1)



$GR_t$  is the growth rate obtained by taking the difference in the logs of GDPC,  $PM_t$  is the Popular

movement,  $(other)$  is the Public debt, trade balance, foreign investment, inflation rate,

unemployment rate  $\varepsilon_t$  is the stochastic error term .

## 4. Empirical Results

### 4.1. Main Results

Table 1 summarizes the statistical properties of the data set and Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables. Provides. Macroeconomic indicators at the periphery level, that is, the change in per capita GDP and the level of unemployment. The data was averaged for the two periods 2014-2019 and 2020-2021. The years 2014-2019 represent the period of "before the Algerian popular movement", associated with low GDP growth in all parties and an unemployment rate close to the European average.

The years 2020-2021 represent the "post-Algerian popular movement" period, associated with a rise in per capita GDP across almost all sides and an unemployment rate close to the European average

### 4.2. Final results

The estimation results are shown in Table 3 in all three columns, over-definition constraints are not rejected, indicating that the model is well defined. There is also no evidence of second-order autocorrelation in residues. At the same time, the results of economic growth show a positive dependence on the Algerian popular movement

With regard to economic variables, starting with changes in per capita output, it came with a remarkably positive sign in all three columns of Table 3, which means that the shift to a more favorable macroeconomic environment benefits the Algerian state. On the other hand, the coefficient (une) is negative in Table 4, which indicates that unemployment is negatively reflected in Algeria.

Turning to fiscal policy, the inflation rate, trade balance, in all columns of Table 4 has negative signs at 1 percent or 5 percent, indicating an overall positive effect of tax increases on the share of participation in the popular movement.

On the other hand, the term balance of payments enters positively on all columns, indicating that the reductions of the fiscal deficit are positively reflected on the popular movement, and we can reject the hypothesis that the effects of fiscal policy are reflected on the popular movement.

By moving to the terms of interaction (other \* GR) and (other \* PM), respectively, it refers to the post-popular movement government that has contributed to the growth of per capita GDP, and this leads to accepting the hypothesis that the movement has a positive impact on the economy

## 5. Conclusions

It was expected that the movement would have a negative impact on growth. We find that the Algerian popular movement came to a positive degree on public finances, and there was a positive correlation between the popular movement and economic growth.

Accordingly, the popular movement worked to increase economic growth in the region of Algeria through the post-mobility government; as the events of the popular movement positively affected the overall economic stability, especially since the post-popular movement government tried to reduce public debt, through productive policies, both at the level of agriculture and trade Structural plans adopted at the macro level. The government after the popular movement has paid more attention to rebuilding public institutions in a modern and effective manner. Thus, these institutions will allow financial markets to operate under better economic conditions, potentially creating more jobs, helping reduce rampant unemployment, and improving growth rates. Further research can examine convergence in the income of an individual in a reasonably homogeneous sample over the long term. Doing so may require long-term data outside the scope of the current research.

Overall, our results implicitly suggest that the peaceful resolution of political disputes, can lead to increased exports, foreign investment, and tourism allowing them to increase fiscal discipline, restore current account imbalances, expand foreign reserves, and boost economic growth in the country.

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## Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
(GR)	4.49	4.50	0.4	24
(PM)	73.93	2.84	68.7	80
(Bb)	10.87	22.26	-44.2	24
(TR)	14.03	5.56	-0.5	47
(Une)	32.85	21.42	1.9	75
(other)	54.42	23.55	-3.7	84

Table 2: Cross-correlation matrix of explanatory variables

	(GR)	(PM)	(Bb)	(TR)	(Une)	(other)
(GR)	1					
(PM)	0.02	1				
(Bb)	0.05	0.02	1			
(TR)	0.01	0.03	0.02	1		
(Une)	-0.10	-0.19	-0.004	-0.02	1	
(other)	-0.14	0.003	-0.11	-0.018	0.09	1

Table 3: popular movement and economic growth Estimation results System-GMM

Regressor	(2)		
	(1)		(3)
(GR)	0.406 *	0.401 **	0.917
(PM)	(0.239)	(0.176 )	(0.330)
(Bb)	(0.248)	(0.354)	(0.244)
(TR)	-0.359	-0.166	-0.153
(Une)	-0.202***	-0.322***	-0.259***
(Inf)	-0.198	-0.329	-0.166
(other)jt*(GR)	0.381	0.038	0.096
(other)jt*(GR)	0.146	0.015	0.075

Periphery Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
m1 [p-value]	0.641 [0.00]	0.593 [0.00]	0.974 [0.00]
m2 [p-value]	0.071 [0.50]	0.750 [0.50]	0.031 [0.91]
Hansen [p-value]	0.167	0.184	0.255

)